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BOOK REVIEW 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE NEW DEAL 
THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: The Constitutional Revolution in 
the Age of Roosevelt. By William E. Leuchtenburg. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. Pp. 350. $30.00. 
Reviewed by Neal Devins* 
On March 29, 1937, America's constitutional landscape changed for- 
ever. A series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and federal 
efforts to combat the Depression lowered Commerce Clause and other 
barriers to centralized planning. These decisions cleared the way for 
launching the administrative state.' 
On April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court called into question the wis- 
dom and continuing vitality of that constitutional revolution, ruling for 
the first time in sixty years that a federal statute exceeded the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause.2 While it is too early to tell 
whether this return to "first principles"3 will prove to be "epochal"4 or 
merely a blip that will disappear from the radar screen altogether, this 
possible return of a "'Constitution-in-exile' "15may soon give New Deal 
nay-sayers another nail to hammer into the coffin of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt's increasingly beleaguered legacy.6 
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. Thanks to 
Dave Douglas, Robert Glennon, Hugh Graham, Alan Meese, and Eben Moglen for reading 
a preliminary draft of this Review. Thanks also to Rod Ingram and Dan Pringle for 
research assistance, and to the editors and staff of the Columbia Law Review for their care 
and persistence. 
1. While commentators have both heralded this event as "another great leap along 
the arc of nationalistic self-definition initiated by the American Revolution," 1 Bruce 
Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 105 (1991), and vilified it as "unconstitutional,. . 
. nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution," Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise 
of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1231 (1994), few would dispute that the 
New Deal "altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to suggest 
something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place." Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 448 (1987). 
2. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (invalidating federal law 
that criminalized possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school). 
3. Id. 
4. Cf. id. at 1657 (Souter,J., dissenting) (describing the majority's holding "as only a 
misstep, . . . not quite in gear with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case"). 
5. Linda Greenhouse, Past Masters: Blowing the Dust Off the Constitution That Was, 
N.Y. Times, May 28, 1995, ? 4, at 1 (quoting appeals court judge and Reagan Supreme 
Court nominee Douglas H. Ginsburg). 
6. The 1994 Republican takeover of Congress directly challenged the New Deal belief 
in centralized planning, including the creation of mission agencies to address identified 
social ills. In particular, the Republican Contract with America calls attention to the failings 
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Despite its transformative effect, there has always been considerable 
doubt about whether the New Deal reached its potential. In 1937 and 
1938, for example, Congress turned down Roosevelt's efforts both to re- 
organize the federal government7 and to improve the lot of the poorest 
third of the nation through such measures as sweeping housing reforms.8 
The rejection of these and other reform proposals, writes David M. 
Kennedy, "may be taken as a harbinger of the principal question that has 
animated New Deal scholarship ever since: Why was there not even more 
radical change precipitated out of that moment of unprecedented 
trauma and apparent political opportunity in the great crisis of the 
1930s?"9 
At the heart of this inquiry, a vigorous debate has emerged about the 
wisdom of Roosevelt's efforts to displace the Lochner-era judiciary through 
his ill-fated Courtpacking plan.10 On one side of this divide, the 
Courtpacking plan has been credited with triggering Justice Owen J. 
Roberts's willingness-after casting the decisive vote against several early 
New Deal initiatives-to sign onto the FDR agenda, the so-called "Switch 
in Time Save[d] Nine."'"I On the other side, the Courtpacking campaign 
has been labelled as counterproductive and has been criticized for only 
galvanizing opposition to New Deal initiatives while accomplishing little 
else.'2 Having raged for more than fifty years, this debate shows no sign 
of letting up. 
of a too powerful central government. See Louis Fisher, The 'Contract With America': 
What It Really Means, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 22, 1995, at 20 ("The Contract indicts the 
national government as 'too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money.' 
(quoting Newt Gingrich et al., Contract with America 7 (1994)). 
7. See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940, 
at 277-80 (1963). 
8. See id. at 135-36. 
9. David M. Kennedy, How FDR Derailed the New Deal, Atlantic Monthly, July 1995, 
at 87, 92. 
10. The most provocative and illuminating treatment of this topic is Barry Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994). For commentary on Cushman, 
see Eben Moglen, Toward a New Deal Legal History, 80 Va. L. Rev. 263 (1994); Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 Va. L. Rev. 277 (1994). 
11. Joseph Aslop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days, at 135 (1938). New Deal 
Department of Justice officials have vigorously advanced this understanding. See Robert 
H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power 
Politics 190-91 (1941); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National 
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 681-82 (1946) (arguing that Supreme Court 
believed that it had to switch in time to avoid public acceptance of Courtpacking plan). 
For Roosevelt, "the [switch] would never have come, unless this frontal attack had been 
made." Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails lxvi (1937 volume) (1941) [hereinafter Roosevelt 
Papers]. 
12. For example, responding to Roosevelt's claim that although "he had lost the 
[Courtpacking] battle [he had] won the war," (p. 156) James MacGregor Burns concluded 
that "in view of the breakdown of the 'Grand Coalition' in the Democratic party that the 
Court-packing episode had triggered, 'it could better be said that [Roosevelt] lost the 
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William E. Leuchtenburg's The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitu- 
tional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt provides insights into this and other 
matters. Through a gripping and lucid account of some of the cases 
which inspired the Courtpacking plan and, more significantly, the politics 
surrounding its introduction and eventual defeat, Leuchtenburg reveals 
that "at the time [of its proposal], the plan seemed to have an inherent 
logic and even inevitability" (p. 131). Leuchtenburg, however, also ac- 
knowledges that this failed strategy ultimately "helped blunt the most im- 
portant drive for social reform in American history and squandered the 
advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in 1936" (p. 157). While the costs of 
pursuing this strategy now appear greater than the risks of not launching 
a "frontal attack" against the Court,'3 Leuchtenburg makes it clear that 
the Courtpacking proposal was much more than the Roosevelt Adminis- 
tration "acting out" against a Supreme Court which it despised (pp. 108, 
213-14). Not only were New Deal social welfare programs at stake, but 
FDR's pursuit of centralized authority within the executive branch also 
had been called into question.'4 
Leuchtenburg's uncovering of the sources of the Roosevelt Adminis- 
tration's dissatisfaction with the Court is masterful. By focusing on White 
House reaction to "Old Court" decisionmaking, Leuchtenburg demon- 
strates why a politician as astute as Roosevelt would risk political disaster 
through his Courtpacking plan (pp. 85-131). Leuchtenburg fails, how- 
ever, to explain the significance of his historiography. Instead, he serves 
up a series of integrally interconnected essays-most of which have am 
peared as book chapters or journal articles-without explaining how they 
speak to each other. In large measure, this is intentional. Perceiving that 
some readers "may be interested only in a particular essay or essays," (p. 
ix) Leuchtenburg, perhaps the preeminent New Deal historian, has opted 
for a "greatest hits" anthology-style presentation. As a result, the whole of 
The Supreme Court Reborn falls short of its potential. While many of its case 
studies are wonderfully crafted and insightful,' Leuchtenburg leaves the 
reader alone to draw ultimate conclusions about the Roosevelt Revolu- 
tion. This is unfortunate, for there are dots that can and should be con- 
nected, and there are issues worthy of mention that get none. 
battle, won the campaign, but lost the war.'" James M. Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and 
the Fox 315 (1956). 
13. For an opposing argument that the Courtpacking plan was, at most, an ill-advised 
gambit "in view of the situation Roosevelt faced at the time," see Michael Nelson, The 
President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Courtpacking Episode of 1937, 103 Pol. Sci. Q. 267, 292 (1988) (exploring Roosevelt's proposals for governmental reorganization). 
14. On Roosevelt's interest in centralizing governmental authority, see generally 
Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government 6-11 (1966) (providing 
background on factors that influenced Roosevelt's approach to government 
reorganization). 
15. See, e.g., pp. 82-131 (on Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan) and 180-212 (on the 
appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court). 
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Over the past several years, scholars have raised important questions 
about whether the New Deal's pre-1937 defeats were at least in part attrib- 
utable to bad lawyering, meaning poorly crafted statutes and misguided 
litigation strategies.16 Roosevelt and his advisors have been criticized for 
failing to take this possibility into account when crafting their Courtpack- 
ing plan.17 While no clear consensus has emerged, this claim, that lawy- 
ering matters, is of more than academic interest. It suggests that 
Roosevelt could have avoided the backlash that followed the Courtpack- 
ing debacle, and that he could have convinced Congress to approve reor- 
ganization and other post-1937 reform efforts.18 It also reveals that judi- 
cial review can be influenced both by skillful lawyering and by judicial 
appointments, something which today seems obvious, but was far from 
clear during the pre-1937 tumult. 
Leuchtenburg does not seriously address arguments that the 
Supreme Court was prepared to make its switch irrespective of 
Courtpacking.19 Furthermore, although recognizing that Courtpacking 
hurt Roosevelt, Leuchtenburg pays scant attention to the relationship be- 
tween Courtpacking and Roosevelt's failed efforts to expand the adminis- 
trative presidency (pp. 157-58). He also does not consider how 
Courtpacking played into growing fears of centralized planning, which at 
the time were associated with totalitarian regimes. 
That the whole of The Supreme Court Reborn may be less than the sum 
of its often brilliant parts does not undermine the value of this collection. 
Part I of this Book Review will highlight the ample teachings of 
Leuchtenburg's work and, in so doing, will make explicit some of the 
connections among the vignettes which make up The Supreme Court Re- 
16. For arguments that such lawyering mattered, see Peter Irons, The New Deal 
Lawyers 4-6, 10-13 (1982) (arguing that different models of lawyering and intra-agency 
lawyering conflicts both matter); Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The 
Current of Commerce Decisions from Swif to Jones & Laughlin, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 105, 
146 (1992) (arguing that "craftsmanlike labors of the NLRB lawyers" presented Supreme 
Court with well-established doctrinal theory to sustain the Wagner Act); Nelson, supra note 
13, at 289 (arguing that even though legal craftsmanship alone would not move the 
Supreme Court, it made the Court's task of reviewing legislation easier); cf. Moglen, supra 
note 10, at 269-72 (arguing against Ackerman's thesis that fate of first New Deal differed 
from second because of badly drafted and poorly defended legislation). For arguments 
that lawyering did not matter, see Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Lawyers and the Legislation of the 
Early New Deal, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 948, 950-56 (1983) (book review) (assuming the 
importance of the Courtpacking plan and claiming that "a thousand Clarence Darrows 
would not likely have persuaded the [pre-1937] Court [to act] otherwise"); William F. 
Treanor, Book Note, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 611, 612 (1983); cf.Jackson, supra note 11, 
at 185-87 (suggesting that conservative justices were entrenched and determined to thwart 
the liberal administration). 
17. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 249 (arguing that early New Deal statutes failed 
because of poor drafting). 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra note 41 and text accompanying notes 105-106. 
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born.20 In particular, Part I will reveal that the Courtpacking plan was 
responsive to Supreme Court opposition to both New Deal social welfare 
reforms and to centralizing governmental authority in the President. Part 
II of this Book Review will challenge the Roosevelt Administration's con- 
viction-shared by Leuchtenberg21 -that the only way to affect Supreme 
Court decisionmaking was through purely political means, by packing the 
Court with pro-New Deal Justices.22 By pointing to the ways in which im- 
proved statutory drafting and brief writing and Roosevelt's landslide vic- 
tory in 1936 facilitated post-1937 Supreme Court approval of New Deal 
programs, Part II will uncover the plan's de minimis role in the 1937 
revolution. 
Part III of this Book Review will extend the analysis to a controversy 
that Leuchtenburg does not address-the nexus between the Courtpack- 
ing battle and Roosevelt's efforts to centralize the government, especially 
thejustice Department. Like the Courtpacking scheme, Roosevelt's 1933 
reorganization of the Justice Department valued enhancing the power of 
the administrative presidency over good lawyering.23 Coincidentally, 
Roosevelt's decision to centralize litigation authority within the Depart- 
ment ofJustice paid next to no attention to the adverse consequences of 
this scheme on the quality of government arguments before the Supreme 
Court.24 The Justice Department reorganization therefore is an earlier 
example of the failure, inherent in the Courtpacking scheme, to consider 
the possible link between good lawyering and victories in court. Further- 
more, the fact that the 1933 Department of Justice reorganization suc- 
ceeded,25 whereas subsequent efforts at centralization failed, suggests 
that, absent the backlash from the Courtpacking plan, more far-reaching 
centralization could have been achieved. 
My argument is that Roosevelt's adherence to the idea of a powerful 
administrative presidency blinded him to the value of good lawyering. 
Ironically, the fallout from the Courtpacking scheme-a prime example 
of valuing the ideal of a strong president over good lawyering-under- 
mined future efforts to enhance the administrative presidency. Conse- 
quently, although Leuchtenburg quite rightly suggests that enhancing 
20. I will not refer to either Leuchtenburg's chapter on the Supreme Court's 
application, from 1925 to 1969, of select Bill of Rights amendments to state and local 
government action (pp. 237-58) or his chapter on Justice Holmes's 1927 Buck v. Bell 
decision, upholding mandatory sterilization of the mentally retarded (pp. 3-25). These 
two chapters, although valuable for other reasons, have very little to do with the events 
leading up to, or the immediate aftermath of, the constitutional revolution of 1937. 
21. Leuchtenburg summarily dismisses claims that Roosevelt's Courtpacking 
campaign played, at best, a small part in triggering the 1937 constitutional revolution. See 
infra text accompanying notes 105-106. 
22. In fact, Roberts's so-called "switch" occurred before the Courtpacking plan's 
introduction, suggesting that perhaps the combination of better lawyering and the 1936 
elections, not Courtpacking, triggered the 1937 revolution. See infra note 72. 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48, 132-140. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 110, 127-129. 
25. See infra text accompanying note 150. 
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the administrative presidency mattered as much to Roosevelt and his 
close aides as did getting the New Deal social welfare agenda through 
Congress and the Court, The Supreme Court Reborn falls short because it 
does not consider the worth of scholars, who have pointed out that a little 
lawyering would have gone a long way toward getting the Court to ap- 
prove many of the New Deal reforms. Like Roosevelt, Leuchtenburg as- 
sumes that the only way to change the Court was through political means. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 
From 1933 to 1937, Franklin Delano Roosevelt fought a bitter battle 
with the Supreme Court over the structure and mission of the federal 
government. This Part will examine that struggle. In particular, the 
sources of FDR's Courtpacking proposal-perceptively revealed by The 
Supreme Court Reborn-will be uncovered. What is uncovered is that as 
much as there was a desire to expand social welfare programs, Roosevelt 
and his allies were also driven by their belief in the power of the adminis- 
trative presidency. 
A. The New Deal Meets the Four Horsemen 
FDR's New Deal promised nothing less than a social revolution. 
"The word 'Deal,' " proclaimed Roosevelt, "implied that the Government 
itself was going to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objec- 
tives .... The word 'New' implied that a new order of things designed to 
benefit the great mass . .. would replace the old order of social privilege 
. . . .26 The 1932 election heralded this New Deal. Not only did 
Roosevelt win the presidency, but the Democrats also swept Capitol Hill 
with a three-to-one majority in the House of Representatives and a two-to- 
one majority in the Senate.27 "Swept into office with a mandate to repair 
the ravages of the Depression,"28 Congress and the White House 
launched their "Hundred Days War," with Congress enacting into law- 
sometimes "sight unseen," with less than an hour of debate, and "[w] ith a 
26. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 2 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 5 (1938). For FDR, 
the "Old Order," by embracing laissez-faire economics, was insensitive to the "radical 
transformation" of the nation's economic substructure brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 
47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 454 (1995) (noting that from the end of the Civil War until 1929, "the 
total value of manufactured products increased nearly twenty times; railroad track mileage 
went from under 40,000 miles nationwide to over 260,000; [and] the urban population 
increased from 16.1 percent to 49.1 percent"). As such, Roosevelt maintained, the Old 
Order was responsible for the Great Depression. The "New Deal," in contrast, would 
reinvigorate government, lifting the "barriers to the reasonable exercise of legislative 
powers, both state and national, to meet the urgent needs of the twentieth-century 
community." Jackson, supra note 11, at 175. 
27. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3. 
28. Id. 
1996] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 243 
unanimous shout" rather than a roll call vote-"the most extraordinary 
series of reforms in the nation's history. "29 
The last word on the one hundred day session of the first New Deal, 
however, was spoken by the Supreme Court, where many reform meas- 
ures ran into a judicially constructed brick wall.30 Unlike the Congress 
and White House, the federal courts were decidedly a part of the Old 
Order.31 From 1920 to 1932, Roosevelt's three Republican predecessors 
appointed six Supreme CourtJustices as well as two-thirds of the courts of 
appeals judges and three-fourths of the district court bench.32 Making 
matters worse, the three remaining Supreme Court Justices-James Mc- 
Reynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter-were part of the 
"Four Horsemen of Reaction" that opposed the New Deal (p. 174). With- 
out question, as Leuchtenburg's history makes clear, these jurists were 
the immovable obstacles to New Deal reforms. 
To dramatize the stakes and intensity of the FDR-Court battles, 
Leuchtenburg serves up two delectable case studies, each of which illus- 
trates a different feature of the tension between the Administration and 
the "Old Court." Leuchtenburg's tale of the Rail Pension decision,33 inval- 
idating Congressional efforts to require railroad owners and railworkers 
to contribute to a common pension pool, highlights the Court's opposi- 
tion to social reform programs (pp. 26-52). His account of Humphrey's 
Executor v. United States,34 prohibiting the President from firing an FTC 
Commissioner without cause, suggests the existence of judicial animosity 
towards Roosevelt's efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency 
(pp. 52-82). 
Leuchtenburg treats the five-to-four Rail Pension decision as monu- 
mental, signalling the Old Court's disapproval of the New Deal. When 
the decision was issued on May 6, 1935, there was great uncertainty about 
the Court's attitude towards the New Deal, as well as corresponding state 
reform efforts (p. 26). In 1934 and again in the first months of 1935, the 
Supreme Court had issued a series of mixed decisions, some invalidating, 
and others approving, state and federal reform efforts.35 In Rail Pension, 
by admonishing Congress for "fail [ing] to distinguish constitutional 
29. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 43, 61. During its historic 100-day session, 
Congress, among other things, "committed the country to an unprecedented program of 
government-industry cooperation; . . . accepted responsibility for the welfare of millions of 
unemployed; . . . undert[ook] huge public works spending; guaranteed the small bank 
deposits of the country; and ... established federal regulation of Wall Street." Id. at 61. 
30. Id. at 143-45. 
31. For a discussion of the "Old Order," see Jackson, supra note 11, at 70-74. For an 
insightful treatment of the role of "critical elections" on relations between the Court and 
elected government, see Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975). 
32. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3. 
33. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
34. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
35. For an inventory of 1933-1936 Court decisions, seeJackson, supra note 11, at 181. 
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power from social desirability,"36 the Court appeared poised to strike 
down Social Security and other New Deal reforms. According to 
Leuchtenburg, the decision's strident tone-especially since it was writ- 
ten by the previously moderateJustice Owen Roberts-"sent shock waves 
through the White House and the New Deal agencies [and] . . . created 
deep fissures between the executive branch and the Supreme Court" (p. 
27). Indeed, within one week of the decision, Attorney General Homer 
Cummings signalled the Administration's interest in striking back at the 
Court,37 writing Assistant Attorney General Angus MacLean to learn 
whether" 'any study has been made in this office of the right of the Con- 
gress, by legislation, to limit the terms and conditions upon which the 
Supreme Court can pass on constitutional questions'" (p. 51).38 
Cummings, however, might have been better served by turning his 
attention internally to the manner in which Congress enacted, and the 
Justice Department defended, the pension program.39 Rather than build 
a record to support the measure's impact on the flow of interstate com- 
merce, "Congress whipped the legislation through," with the House "con- 
sider[ing] it for only forty minutes before registering its approval" (p. 
32). Leuchtenburg's history also casts doubt on the Justice Department's 
handling of the case. While the Department focused its "efforts on dem- 
onstrating that the law stay within the commerce power," steering clear 
from the measure's "social desirability" (p. 34), a memorandum drafted 
by Rail Pension dissenter Benjamin Cardozo suggests that the Justice De- 
partment " 'laid undue stress ... upon the danger of keeping superannu- 
ated men in the [workforce]'" (p. 41). For Cardozo, this emphasis" 'has 
given color to the [claim] . .. that the professed motive of the statute is 
36. Railroad Retirement Bd., 295 U.S. at 367. The Court therefore found the statute to 
be little more than "a naked appropriation of private property" in violation of due process. 
Id. at 350. Of equal significance, the Court also concluded that the pension did not 
protect interstate commerce and therefore found the statute outside of Congress's 
commerce power. See id. at 362. The Court reasoned that to the extent that efficiency, 
economy or safety "demand[s] the elimination of aged employees, their retirement from 
the service [without a pension] would suffice to accomplish the object." Id. at 367. As 
such, the pension was unnecessary to protect interstate commerce. See id. at 374. 
37. Cummings, in a letter to Roosevelt, described the case as a "forecast of what we 
may expect with reference to almost any form of social legislation." Letter from Homer 
Cummings, Attorney General, to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President (May 7, 1935), 
reprinted in Selected Papers of Homer Cummings: Attorney General of the United States 
1933-1939, at 130 (Carl B. Swisher ed., 1939). 
38. Four months earlier, at a January 11, 1935 Cabinet meeting, Cummings reported 
that Roosevelt had suggested that "if the Court went against the Government" in a case 
involving Congress's authority to regulate the currency through gold legislation, "the 
number of justices should be increased at once so as to give a favorable majority" (p. 86) 
(quoting Jan. 11, 1935 entry in Harold L. Ickes diary). 
39. Leuchtenburg never criticizes the Justice Department's handling of Rail Pension, 
although his history casts doubt on the Department's litigation strategy. 
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not the true one' " (p. 41).40 The possibility that the Congress and the 
Justice Department were partially responsible for the Rail Pension deci- 
sion is not one that Leuchtenburg takes seriously. In a footnote, he dis- 
misses claims that better lawyering and better legislative drafting might 
have enabled the Old Court, without repudiating pre-New Deal prece- 
dents, to find ways to uphold much of the New Deal (pp. 317 n.95).4' 
Beyond the stridency of the Rail Pension decision, Leuchtenburg also 
points to "Black Monday," May 27, 1935, when the Court handed down a 
trilogy of unanimous decisions invalidating key New Deal initiatives.42 
The most famous of Black Monday's program victims was the Na- 
tional Industrial Recovery Act, "an instrument forged in the heat of the 
famed '100 Days' of 1933 and wielded as the Roosevelt Administration's 
chief weapon in the war against the Depression."43 The Supreme Court Re- 
born, however, sets its sights on a less controversial, but equally important, 
Black Monday decision, Humphrey's Executor v. United States. At one level, 
Humphrey's Executor seems anything but monumental: approving a 
backpay award to the estate of an FTC Commissioner. Within the White 
House, however, Humphrey's Executor was considered a major blow to the 
President and his reform agenda, which emphasized the rise of the ad- 
ministrative state and, with it, a significant expansion of presidential au- 
thority (pp. 78-80). 
Perceiving that government must be able to react "flexibly and rap- 
idly to stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from fluc- 
tuations in the unmanaged market,"44 the Roosevelt Administration con- 
sidered a presidentially managed "system of more unified powers"45 to be 
an essential part of its social reform agenda. For this system to work, the 
President must be in charge of the instruments of administration, includ- 
ing, of course, the power to hire and fire agency heads. The Humphrey's 
Executor case squarely raised this issue. William Humphrey, a Coolidge 
FTC appointee who supported big business and opposed the New Deal, 
was dismissed because, as Roosevelt explained to Humphrey, "'I do not 
40. Moreover, according to Leuchtenburg, Cardozo perceived that "there was a better 
way to defend the law-by analogizing it to a workmen's compensation act" (p. 41) 
(summarizing Cardozo's memorandum). 
41. Leuchtenburg concludes that Barry Cushman's work, supra note 10, is not 
credible. Noting (in a footnote) that Cushman did not conduct "original research in the 
papers of the Justices" and did not scrutinize "most of the cases of the era," Leuchtenburg 
discounts Cushman's history as being, at best, conclusory (p. 318 n.95). Leuchtenburg, 
however, never considers Peter Irons's related work on New Deal lawyering. See Irons, 
supra note 16. For further discussion, see infra note 121. 
42. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (rejecting 
presidential dismissal of Federal Trade Commissioner); LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National Industrial Recovery Act). 
43. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 87. 
44. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 424. 
45. Id. at 440. For further discussion of the administrative presidency, see infra Part 
III. 
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feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies 
or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and frankly, I 
think it is best for the people of this country that I should have full confi- 
dence'" (p. 60). 
Leuchtenburg's account of the ensuing dispute is truly marvelous 
and brings out the extent to which the FDR-Court battle line was really 
drawn over the power of the American President. In particular, this 
chronicle reveals the White House's belief that Humphrey's Executor was 
animated by Court hostility towards Roosevelt and his administrative pres- 
idency. When argued, Solicitor General Stanley Reed thought the case 
"couldn't be lost" (p. 64).46 Reed's confidence stemmed from the 
Court's sweeping approval of presidential removal authority in the 1926 
Myers v. United States47 decision.48 Humphrey's Executor, by unanimously 
ruling against the President without even hinting that the Court had 
changed its mind,49 shocked and outraged the Administration (pp. 
78-80). Attorney General Cummings and presidential advisor Felix 
Frankfurter concluded that the Court was animated by a " 'touch of mal- 
ice'" (p. 79) and a "'disposition . . . to curb the executive powers'" (p. 
78). As a result, "[t]he Humphrey ruling went far to persuade the Presi- 
dent that, sooner or later, he would have to take bold action against a 
Court that, from personal animus, was determined to embarrass him and 
to destroy his program" (p. 79). 
B. From Courtpacking to Constitutional Revolution 
Roosevelt's "bold action" was the Courtpacking plan of 1937. Claim- 
ing that the Supreme Court was unable to function effectively, Roosevelt 
proposed legislation that would empower the President, for every Justice 
over seventy years of age, to appoint an additional Justice until the 
number of Supreme CourtJustices reached fifteen.50 Lacking, as Robert 
Jackson put it, "the simplicity and clarity which was the President's ge- 
46. After being instructed by Attorney General Cummings to "'pick out [a case] that 
you can win,' " Reed selected Humphrey's Executor (p. 64). Congress, too, thought the issue 
was well settled. Humphrey was advised by Senator C.C. Dill that " 'after all the President is 
boss and I can't control his appointments'" (p. 59). More striking, Roosevelt's 
appointment of George Mathews to succeed Humphrey was approved unanimously by 
Congress (p. 63). 
47. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
48. In fact, before Roosevelt fired Humphrey, the Administration was advised, by a 
former Supreme Court clerk who worked on the case (James Landis), that the Myers Court 
" 'deliberately put' " into its decision " 'statements to the effect that the President's power 
of removal extended to members of various independent commissions'" (p. 69). The 
Administration's defeat in Humphrey's Executor then cannot be blamed on poor lawyering 
and strategizing. 
49. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725-26 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing Humphrey's Executor as "gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or 
historical precedent" the Court's "carefully researched and reasoned" opinion in Myers.) 
50. When his Courtpacking plan was introduced, sixJustices were over 70 (including 
all of the Four Horsemen). Under his plan, Roosevelt intended to transform the Court by 
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nius,"'5' the plan's announcement prompted an immediate and intense 
firestorm of criticism from Congress, the press, and the Court itself. Why 
then did the President choose this "technical and confusing"52 approach? 
Leuchtenburg is at his best in answering this and several other questions 
about the Courtpacking imbroglio, including why Roosevelt did not act 
sooner; why he felt compelled to launch a "frontal attack"53 on the Court; 
why, despite his landslide 1936 victory and an overwhelmingly Demo- 
cratic Congress, the plan failed; and what the political consequences of 
this failure were. 
Leuchtenburg uncovers that Roosevelt's plan "was not a capricious 
act but the result of a long period of gestation in which it seemed sensible 
to conclude that the problem lay not in the Constitution but in the com- 
position of the Supreme Court" (p. 131). At the same time, fearful that 
an overly aggressive attack against the Court might cost him at the polls,54 
"Roosevelt maintained a studied silence on the question" throughout the 
1936 campaign (p. 107). By February 1937, with the Court set to rule on 
the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, state minimum 
wage laws, and several other matters (p. 108), the President felt he could 
wait no longer. Rejecting a constitutional amendment as too time con- 
suming (p. 110) and perceiving the public to be fed up with the Court 
and quite enthralled with him,55 Roosevelt settled on a plan that would 
allow him to transform the Court at once by appointing Justices sympa- 
thetic to the New Deal and its vision of an administrative presidency (pp. 
108-27). 
Unanticipated, yet easily discoverable, social and political forces im- 
periled this gambit, however. Gallup polls, for example, revealed that 
most voters opposed restrictions on the Court, supported Court decisions 
striking down the National Recovery Act and the Agriculture Adjustment 
Act, and hoped that Roosevelt's second term would be more conservative 
than his first.56 Fearing the central planning and executive supremacy 
associated with the totalitarian governments of Hitler and Mussolini, vot- 
ers strongly opposed a radical transformation of either the American eco- 
nomic system or the balance of power among the three branches of gov- 
either replacing these Justices (if they retired) or appointing additional Justices (if they 
remained on the Court). 
51. Jackson, supra note 11, at 189. 
52. Id. 
53. Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at lxvi. 
54. These fears were well-founded. Following his "Black Monday" defeats, Roosevelt 
chastised the Court for relegating the nation "to [its] horse-and-buggy definition of 
interstate commerce." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference (May 31, 1935), in 4 
Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 220-21. This comment "created a furor" (p. 90) and 
convinced the President of the need to move slowly on this issue. 
55. Roosevelt, undoubtedly, was also buoyed by likely congressional support for the 
measure. Congressional disapproval of the Court was apparent; for example, "[t] he years 
1935-1937 saw more 'Court-curbing' bills introduced in Congress than in any other three- 
year (or thirty-five year) period in history." Nelson, supra note 13, at 273. 
56. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 212, 241-43; Nelson, supra note 13, at 277-78. 
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ernment.57 The Courtpacking proposal, moreover, divided Democrats in 
Congress, with "a number of Democratic Senators search[ing] desper- 
ately for some device that would free them from the need to commit 
themselves" (p. 139).58 Nevertheless, one month after its introduction, 
the proposal seemed likely to prevail. Democrats in Congress, as 
Leuchtenburg rightly observes, "might not [have] like[d] the scheme, 
but they could not justify frustrating the President while the Court per- 
sisted in mowing down legislation" (p. 142). 
On "White Monday," March 29, 1937, the Court gave these Demo- 
crats a way out. Reversing its ten-month-old decision that New York's 
minimum wage law was unconstitutional, the Court performed the 
"Greatest Constitutional Somersault in History" (p. 176), upholding a 
nearly identical Washington statute.59 Over the next several weeks, by 
upholding the Social Security Act60 and the National Labor Relations 
Act,6' the Court made it clear that it was willing to sign off onto the New 
Deal and related state reform efforts. "Thus the Court, with no change of 
its Justices, . . . convinced the court of Public Opinion that the sentence 
of reorganization posed by the court bill might safely be suspended 
.... "62 With the demise of his Courtpacking plan,63 Roosevelt's efforts to 
transform the Court continued along more traditional lines. The May 18, 
57. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 275-98 (discussing America's fear of the 
"fascist challenge"); Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New 
Deal Revisited, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 195 (describing conservative opposition to the New 
Deal's central planning elements). 
58. Roosevelt's political mishandling of the proposal exacerbated these problems. 
When the proposal was introduced, Roosevelt stressed the difficulty of "aged or infirm" 
Justices trying to manage the Court's crowded docket (pp. 133-34). That strategy 
backfired, especially after ChiefJustice Hughes wrote to Congress to report that the "Court 
is fully abreast of its work" and that an increase in the number ofJustices would make the 
Court less efficient. See S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1937) (Letter from 
Charles E. Hughes to Burton K Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937) (Appendix C)). In response, 
Roosevelt conceded that the real purpose of his plan was to strike back at a Court that was 
"acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making body." Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937), 
in 6 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 122, 125. 
59. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). On "White Monday," the 
Court also upheld the National Firearms Act, the amended Railway Labor Act, and the 
revised Frazier-Lemke Act. For a description of these decisions and the Roosevelt 
Administration reaction to them, seeJackson, supra note 11, at 207-13. 
60. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
61. See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
62. Jackson, supra note 11, at 235. 
63. In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a negative report on the 
Courtpacking measure (p. 146). On July 22, 1937, the Senate-without having voted on 
the measure-returned Roosevelt's Courtpacking proposal to the Judiciary Committee 
"from which it never emerged" (p. 153). Leuchtenburg suggests that neither the White 
Monday decisions nor Roosevelt's ability to replace retiring Justice Van Devanter doomed 
the Courtpacking plan. Rather, Leuchtenburg ties the plan's defeat with Senate majority 
leaderJoe Robinson's death on July 14, 1937, the eve of the Court-plan vote (pp. 148-54). 
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1937 retirement of "Four Horseman" Willis Van Devanter64 led to the 
nomination of Senator Hugo Black, a supporter of the Courtpacking plan 
and "a true believer in expanding governmental power" (p. 210).65 Over 
the next two years, through a combination of deaths and retirements, 
Roosevelt appointed four more New Deal allies to the Court, thereby se- 
curing the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 (p. 220). 
"The Constitutional Revolution of 1937," writes Leuchtenburg, "al- 
tered fundamentally the character of the Court's business, the nature of 
its decisions, and the alignment of its friends and foes .... [It] ended, 
apparently forever, the reign of laissez-faire and legitimated the arrival of 
the Leviathan State" (pp. 235-36). For Leuchtenburg, these changes 
were more than a doctrinal evolution; instead, "the reversals and distinc- 
tions ... [were] so numerous and so sweeping that ... [by 1942] much of 
the constitutional law of 1936 appear[ed] to belong to a different consti- 
tution" (p. 233).66 Most strikingly, from 1937 to 1947, the New Deal 
Court overturned thirty pre-1937 decisions.67 
These changes, however, came at a great price, for the Court strug- 
gle "helped blunt the most important drive for social reform in American 
history and squandered the advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in 1936" (p. 
157). The controversy "deeply divided the Democratic party" (p. 158) 
and "helped weld together a bipartisan coalition of anti-New Deal Sena- 
64. Van Devanter's retirement may well have been prompted by Congress's 
enactment of legislation which protected the retirement income of Supreme Court 
Justices. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 88 
(1992). It is also possible that Van Devanter-knowing that Roberts's switch secured the 
1937 constitutional revolution-sought to strengthen opposition to Roosevelt and his 
Courtpacking plan (pp. 143-44). 
65. The Black nomination, as Leuchtenburg ably reveals in a detailed and well-crafted 
case study, was extraordinarily controversial (pp. 180-212). For example, when Black was 
nominated, the Washington Post and other newspapers spoke of finding "'it difficult to 
refer to any Supreme Court nomination which combined lack of training ... and extreme 
partisanship'" (p. 186) (quoting The Black Nomination, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1937, at 8). 
Eclipsing concerns over Black's competence, an imbroglio over Black's one-time 
membership in the Ku Klux Klan consumed the nomination (pp. 188-99). Yet, as 
Leuchtenburg puts it, "[t]here is no evidence, however, that awareness of this past caused 
Roosevelt to think twice about appointing Black" (p. 208). Roosevelt's only concern was 
the fate of New Deal economic legislation and, "given the temper of the times, [it is 
improbable] that civil liberties considerations loomed large in his mind" (p. 208). 
66. Barry Cushman, in contrast, argues that much of the decisionmaking of the New 
Deal Court had its roots in the constitutional law of 1936. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 
203-08; Cushman, supra note 16, at 156; see also Moglen, supra note 10, at 269-72 
(applauding Cushman's discussion of the evolution of New Deal lawyers and the impact of 
this change on the success of New Deal legislation); Purcell, supra note 10, at 280-82 
(agreeing with Cushman's depiction of the 1937 decisions as the result of an intertwining 
of existingjurisprudence). 
67. See C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and 
Values, 1937-1947, at 300-01 (1963). Leuchtenburg's tally of 32 overturned decisions 
includes the reversal of post-1937 decisions (p. 233). 
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tors" (p. 157).68 Furthermore, the middle class's backing of Roosevelt 
"ebbed away" as a result of this dispute (p. 159).69 All of this led 
Roosevelt's Vice President, Henry Wallace, to remark that "[t]he whole 
New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight" 
(p. 158); although "[t]he new Court might be willing to uphold new laws, 
... an angry and divided Congress would pass few of them for the justices 
to consider."70 
II. REEXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not know the value of a good lawyer. 
By refusing to place any faith in the power of improved statute drafting as 
well as governmental advocacy before the Court, Roosevelt attempted to 
use brute political force to take over the Supreme Court. The folly of this 
campaign, as this Part will demonstrate, is that Courtpacking played no 
meaningful role in triggering the 1937 Constitutional Revolution. 
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the Courtpacking plan, despite its 
astronomical costs, is sometimes justified as the price that needed to be 
paid to accomplish Roosevelt's constitutional revolution.71 
Leuchtenburg hints that this is true, rejecting the argument that New 
Deal judicial defeats can be blamed on "[p] oorly drafted laws, weak 
briefs, and careless arguments" (p. 232). Furthermore, he accepts the 
proposition that the Court plan "may well have affected" Owen Roberts, 
whose defection from the Old Court-the so-called "switch in time" - 
signalled the 1937 Constitutional Revolution (p. 143).72 The Supreme 
Court Reborn, however, does not address this topic directly. In fact, 
Leuchtenburg barely considers claims that improved drafting of legisla- 
tion and legal advocacy played a critical role in Roberts's switch.73 This 
omission is unfortunate because strong evidence indicates that the 
Courtpacking plan had, at best, limited bearing on the 1937 Revolution. 
68. Absent the conflagration over the Court plan, it is certainly possible-but far from 
certain-that another controversy would have galvanized opposition to the New Deal. For 
example, the 1937-1938 recession "helped produce a national mood hostile to [New Deal] 
experimentation." Polenberg, supra note 14, at 151. 
69. Roosevelt's standing with the middle class was also hampered by a severe recession 
which called into doubt the New Deal's ability to restore economic prosperity and stability. 
See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 243-44; see also Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the 
Idea of the State, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, at 85, 87 (Steve 
Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (stating that the 1937 recession damaged Roosevelt's 
goals even more than the general dissatisfaction with his Courtpacking plan). 
70. Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 239. 
71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
72. Roberts's "White Monday" approval of state minimum wage laws, as Leuchtenburg 
recognizes, had nothing to do with Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan. Roberts "cast his vote 
[in that case] before the plan was announced" (p. 177). Leuchtenburg's claim is that 
Roberts's subsequent votes "may well" have been influenced by the plan (p. 143). 
73. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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There are several strands to this argument, not all of which are essen- 
tial to accepting it. First, poor statutory drafting during the "One Hun- 
dred Days War" may have exacerbated Old Court hostility towards the 
First New Deal. "The legislation of the [F] irst New Deal," as Michael Nel- 
son writes "was not well drawn; it too often tied sweeping assertions of 
federal power to slap-dash justifications."74 Indeed, Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone spoke of "'[t]he general sloppiness of everything that has been 
done in connection with this effort' " and his " 'hope that Congress will 
now undertake to do its job.' "75 By 1934, a group of highly skilled law- 
yers, attentive to the needs of "writing legislation to skirt the legal 
landmines that were sprinkled through the Court's decisions," joined the 
administration.76 Unlike the "loose draftsmanship and emotional advo- 
cacy" of the First New Deal, observed Arthur Schlesinger, the laws of this 
"Second New Deal were masterpieces of the lawyer's art."77 When 
Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan was proposed, the handiwork of these Sec- 
ond New Deal lawyers was before the Court.78 
Second, poor lawyering may have contributed to some Supreme 
Court defeats. With limited litigation authority until a 1933 FDR reorgan- 
ization79 and without a building until 1935, the pre-Roosevelt Justice De- 
74. Nelson, supra note 13, at 289. Senate Judiciary Chairman Henry Ashurst put it 
this way: "[Because] [w]e ground out laws so fast . . . [we] reasoned from non-existent 
premises and, at times, we seemed to accept chimeras, phantasies and exploded social and 
economic theories as our authentic guides." Cushman, supra note 10, at 250 (quoting 
Henry F. Ashurst, A Many Colored Toga: The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst 333 
(George F. Sparks ed., 1962)). 
75. Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 395 (1956) (quoting 
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Basset Moore, Jan. 20, 1935). Along the same 
lines, after the Court struck down the Administration's 1933 "hot oil" program, Owen 
Roberts informed Interior Secretary Harold Ickes that he was "entirely sympathetic with 
what [the administration was] . . . trying to do in the oil matter and that he hoped we 
would pass a statute that would enable [the Administration to constitutionally] carry out 
[its] policy." Harold L. Ickes, 1 The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand 
Days, 1933-1936, at 269, 273 (1953) (diary entry ofJan. 11, 1935). 
76. Nelson, supra note 13, at 289; see also Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis 
Times, 1918-1969, at 143-45 (1972) (discussing the "[a]ssiduously careful legal 
draftsmen" of the New Deal); Cushman, supra note 10, at 255 (distinguishing the "social 
evangelists" of the First New Deal, who disdained technical precision, from the "precise 
and trenchant" lawyers of the Second New Deal, who "embraced legal exactitude"); Stern, 
supra note 1 1, at 667 (suggesting that one reason the Court, in the Carter Coal case, struck 
down the 1935 Bituminous Coal Act was Congress's failure to heed Department of Justice 
efforts to improve the measure). 
77. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval 395 
(1960). 
78. Witness, for example, the National Labor Relations Act, approved by the Court as 
part of its 1937 "switch." Each of the drafters of this measure was a lawyer and "the legal 
training of the Act's framers was reflected by the central role that constitutional concerns 
played in their shaping of the Act's provisions." Cushman, supra note 16, at 139. For a 
more detailed treatment of this episode, see Irons, supra note 16, at 226-34. 
79. Through a 1933 executive order, Roosevelt transferred litigation authority from 
executive agencies and departments to the Department ofJustice. See infra part III.A. 
252 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:237 
partment had great difficulty attracting high-quality lawyers.80 Matters 
did not improve much under Roosevelt, at least not at first.8' For exam- 
ple, Attorney General Homer Cummings, by staffing the Department 
with "deserving Democrats,"82 prompted Supreme Court Justices Louis 
Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone to express their concerns over the De- 
partment's competence to Roosevelt.83 While Old Court hostility towards 
the New Deal may have made it impossible for any litigation strategy to 
succeed,84 thejustice Department could have done a better job in several 
cases,85 including the Rail Pension86 and National Industrial Recovery 
Act litigation.87 
Third, Old Court resistance to the New Deal programs may have 
been less intense than Leuchtenburg and others suppose.88 The dreaded 
80. On the Department ofJustice's difficulty in recruiting good lawyers, see Jerold S. 
Auerbach & Eugene Bardach, "Born to an Era of Insecurity": Career Patterns of Law 
Review Editors, 1918-1941, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 3, 5 (1973). On the historically shabby 
facilities of the Department of Justice, see William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in 
America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act 103 (1965); Henry F. Pringle, The 
Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography 110 (1939). 
81. For a detailed discussion of how expanded Department of Justice litigation 
authority affected governmental advocacy before the Supreme Court, see infra Part III.A. 
82. Irons, supra note 16, at 11. Cummings, a "Democratic party wheelhorse who 
helped swing the 1932 convention to Roosevelt," was much more a politician than a lawyer. 
Id. 
83. See id.; see also Bruce A. Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection 130 
(1982) (suggesting that Brandeis had questions about Cummings's skills as a lawyer). 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes put it this way: "[T] he laws have been poorly drafted, 
the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have been poorly presented. We've 
had to be not only the Court but we've had to do the work that should have been done by 
the Attorney General." Burton K. Wheeler & Paul F. Healy, Yankee from the West 329 
(1962). While Hughes's comment was somewhat self-serving, seeking to place blame for 
the Courtpacking crisis on the Roosevelt Administration, it contains at least a few kernels 
of truth, for disapproval of New Deal objectives cannot alone explain pre-1937 
decisionmaking. See infra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
84. For example, the Roosevelt Justice Department's defeat in Humphrey's Executor 
cannot be blamed on poor lawyering. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. On Old 
Court hostility towards the New Deal, see generally Rauh, supra note 16, at 949-50 
(discussing the low probability of winning a case before the Supreme Court composed of 
four staunch conservatives and two justices opposed to the New Deal); Treanor, supra note 
16, at 611-13 ("the composition of the Supreme Court made invalidation [of some New 
Deal legislation] inevitable"). 
85. Another example is the "hot oil" case discussed supra note 75. For Interior 
Secretary Harold Ickes: "It makes me sick when I think of the way [the Justice 
Department] handled our oil cases before the Supreme Court." Irons, supra note 16, at 72 
(quoting Harold Ickes). 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
87. See Irons, supra note 16, at 97 (describing how a National Recovery 
Administration attorney who shared oral argument responsibilities with the Solicitor 
General was forced to "contradict[ ] his fellow advocate"); see also Cushman, supra note 
16, at 132. For a discussion of lawyer attitudes (both corporate and governmental) to 
NIRA, see Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty 15-35 (1995). 
88. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 238-49 (discussing Department's failure to 
advance a strong test case); MichaelJ. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: 
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Four Horsemen, for example, cast several votes in favor of New Deal ini- 
tiatives.89 Likewise, Hughes and Roberts, the SwingJustices, "had hardly 
been consistent foes of activist government prior to the plan's announce- 
ment."90 While the New Deal Court certainly transformed, rather than 
built upon Old Court doctrine,9' the fate of the New Deal hinged not just 
on who sat on the Court but also on the lawyering and lawmaking before 
the Court.92 At the least, improvements in Second New Deal lawyering 
provided cover to Justices who were prepared to uphold social reform 
programs without directly contradicting prior decisionmaking. Owen 
Roberts's "switch" is a classic example of this phenomenon, for Roberts 
claimed that he never switched, but, instead, that poor lawyering pre- 
vented him from upholding minimum wage laws in an earlier case.93 
Fourth, beyond the possible failings of lawyers and law writers, the 
1936 election may have convinced the Court (or at leastJustices Roberts 
and Hughes, its two swing voters) of persistent widespread public support 
for the New Deal.94 Indeed, Hughes had written in 1936 that when the 
A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759, 
774-75 n.98 (1992); Moglen, supra note 10, at 269. 
89. The old age provisions of the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority are among these initiatives. For an inventory of cases in which 
some or all of the Four Horsemen signed onto New Deal initiatives, see Cushman, supra 
note 10, at 246-48 n.255. 
90. Klarman, supra note 88, at 774-75 n.98; see supra note 75 for a discussion of 
Justice Roberts; supra note 83 for a discussion ofJustice Hughes; see also Cushman, supra 
note 10, at 243 (discussing Justice Roberts), 249 (discussing Justice Hughes). 
91. On this point, Edward Purcell-responding to Barry Cushman's claim that post- 
1937 decisionmaking is an outgrowth of existing doctrine-made the common sense point 
that "[t]o show that a doctrinal passageway existed is important, but it is not to show why 
the individual Justices-particularly Justice Roberts in a five-to-four decision-chose to 
walk through it." Purcell, supra note 10, at 280. 
92. Peter Irons suggests that good lawyering explains the Court's upholding of the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1937. See Irons, supra note 16, at 288-89. For arguments 
that Irons is wrong, see Rauh, supra note 16, at 952-55; Treanor, supra note 16, at 612. 
93. Specifically, Roberts claimed that the Court was not asked to overturn its 1923 
disapproval of minimum wage restrictions until 1937, when Roberts's supposed "switch" 
took place. See Memorandum from Owen Roberts to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 9, 1945), in 
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 314-15 (1955). For an 
assessment of both Roberts's claim and the authenticity of the Frankfurter memo, compare 
Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 645-51 (1994) 
(arguing that memo was non-existent, or at best, inaccurate) with Richard D. Friedman, A 
Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum, or Felix the Non-Forger, 
142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1985, 1985-95 (1994) [hereinafter Friedman, A Reaffirmation] 
(defending the memo's accuracy) and Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other 
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1891, 1949-53 (1994) (supporting Roberts's claim). 
94. The mid-term 1934 election was far less significant both because of its proximity 
in time to the 1932 election and because Roosevelt, the embodiment of the New Deal, was 
not up for reelection. The 1936 election, moreover, took on added significance because of 
Roosevelt's lopsided electoral margin of 370 to 6. For this reason, I find unpersuasive the 
claims of Barry Cushman and Mike Klarman that, since the 1934 election did not slow 
down the Court's repudiation of several New Deal measures, there is no reason to think 
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Court departed from "its fortress in public opinion,"95 it suffered severely 
from self-inflicted wounds.96 For his part, Roberts, after retiring, ex- 
plained the force of public opinion that beat against the Court: "Looking 
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular 
urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect 
was a unified economy."97 Along these lines, Roberts's shift in the mini- 
mum wage case occurred after the 1936 election but before Roosevelt 
introduced his Courtpacking plan.98 Whether Roberts was simply follow- 
ing the election returns is uncertain; what is clear is that Roberts was not 
bowing solely to the Courtpacking proposal.99 
In light of the foregoing, Roosevelt and his advisors-particularly 
Homer Cummings, the Courtpacking plan's chief architect (pp. 
82-131)-can and should be faulted. By treating their defeats before the 
Court as purely political, the Roosevelt Administration refused to con- 
sider the role that legal writing and lawyering may have played in 
Supreme Court decisionmaking. By failing to look at its own blemishes 
(pp. 78-81), the Administration could not see what the lawyers of the 
Second New Deal did see: namely, an opportunity to fit New Deal pro- 
grams into the fabric of prior Court doctrine.100 Furthermore, by viewing 
the Supreme Court as unalterably opposed to New Deal reforms,101 
Roosevelt did not take into account how his 1936 electoral landslide af- 
fected Supreme Court attitudes. 
that the election of 1936 did influence the Court. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 228-38; 
Klarman, supra note 88, at 774-75 n.98. 
95. Charles E. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 24 (1936). 
96. See id. at 51-53. 
97. Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (1951). For this reason, it is 
possible that Roberts did switch, but did not cave to the pressures of Courtpacking. See 
generally Ariens, supra note 93, at 635-40 (providing Frankfurter's account of the reasons 
for Roberts's switch). 
98. See supra text accompanying note 93. Moreover, according to Felix Frankfurter, 
Roberts voted to grant certiorari in this case prior to the 1936 election. See Frankfurter, 
supra note 93, at 315. Frankfurter's reporting, however, is suspect; it may well have been 
motivated by a desire to shield the Court from charges that its decisionmaking is inherently 
political. See Ariens, supra note 93, at 640-52. For a powerful critique of Ariens, see 
Friedman, A Reaffirmation, supra note 93, at 1985-95. 
99. At the same time, the Courtpacking plan may have figured into Roberts's 
calculation, for Roberts later spoke of being "fully conscious" of the Court plan and 
thought it placed a "tremendous strain" on the Court. See Composition and Jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court: Hearings on SJ. Res. 44 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2nd. Sess. 9 (1954) 
(statement of Owen J. Roberts); see also Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court 59-60 
(1962) (suggesting that Roberts anticipated the Courtpacking plan before its formal 
announcement). It is also likely that Roberts recognized that continuing judicial 
invalidation of the New Deal imposed unacceptable costs on both the Court and the 
nation. On this point, cf. Lessig, supra note 26, at 414 (stating that where judge's rhetoric 
conflicts with "uncontested discourse," judges face "infinite cost" of certain "rhetorical 
moves" and risk engaging in "rhetorical self immolation"). 
100. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 289; supra notes 76-78. 
101. See supra notes 90-93; infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text. 
1996] GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 255 
Roosevelt also underestimated the burgeoning public distrust of a 
too-powerful executive branch. Fears of totalitarian rule and the con- 
comitant belief that the Supreme Court, while far from perfect, checked 
elected government excesses, help explain why "FDR's [Court] message 
generated an intensity of response unmatched by any legislative contro- 
versy of this century" (p. 134). For FDR opponents, the Courtpacking 
plan proved to be a political bonanza, galvanizing opposition to the New 
Deal and prompting "remonstrances comparing Roosevelt to Stuart ty- 
rants and European dictators" (p. 137). The Senate Judiciary Committee 
echoed these concerns, proclaiming "that we would rather have an in- 
dependent Court, . . . a Court that will dare to announce its honest opin- 
ions ... [rather] than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obligation to 
the appointing power" validates governmental action.102 This claim, that 
"[w] e are not the judges of the judges. We are not above the Constitu- 
tion,"'103 enabled Courtpacking plan opponents to cast Roosevelt as being 
more interested in executive-dominated centralized authority than in the 
rule of law. 
This is not to say that Roosevelt did not have good reason to act. 
When his Courtpacking plan was announced, none of the Four Horse- 
men appeared ready to retire, and actuarial tables suggested that even 
the oldest justice would live another five years.104 With reason to think 
that the Old Court would continue to invalidate governmental reform 
efforts, Roosevelt appropriately feared for the future of his New Deal.105 
Furthermore, the possibility that the Second New Deal would have fared 
better than early New Deal legislation does not mean that the Court was 
poised to launch its doctrinal transformation. Instead, as Leuchtenburg 
contends (pp. 231-32), the 1936 election and other external pressures 
were almost certainly necessary to prompt the 1937 Constitutional 
Revolution. 
Whether the Courtpacking plan was a necessary ingredient to this 
mix, however, is quite another matter. The combination of better legal 
writing and Roosevelt's 1936 landslide victory were probably enough to 
secure the critical swing votes of Justices Roberts and Hughes. Through 
the appointment of pro-New Deal Justices, moreover, the sweeping rever- 
sals of Old Court decisionmaking was secured. In other words, the 
Courtpacking plan may well have undermined subsequent New Deal re- 
form efforts without any offsetting benefits. 
102. S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1937). 
103. Id. 
104. SeeJackson, supra note 11, at 185; Nelson, supra note 13, at 289. 
105. The possibility that the Court would follow the 1936 election returns was not 
seriously considered by Roosevelt. See Aslop, supra note 9, at 24. Justice Department 
attorneys, however, did notice "a less hostile attitude in arguments" after Roosevelt's 
landslide victory. Jackson, supra note 11, at 197; see also Nelson, supra note 13, at 291 
(noting that Four Horsemen "treated [Government lawyers] with respect rather than 
contempt" after election). 
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The Supreme Court Reborn never seriously considers this possibility, ar- 
guing instead that the 1937 Revolution was simply too drastic a change to 
have as its primary source better lawyering and the political impact of the 
1936 elections (pp. 231-33). For Leuchtenburg, First New Deal lawyer- 
ing was anything but "inept" (p. 232) and, consequently, "one cannot 
seriously believe that more expert draftsmanship" of Second New Deal 
legislation explains the Court's shift (p. 231). Although he recognizes 
that Roberts's "White Monday" switch occurred after the 1936 election, 
but before the introduction of the Court plan, Leuchtenburg claims that 
"in the long history of the Supreme Court, no event has had more mo- 
mentous consequences than Franklin Roosevelt's [Courtpacking] 
message" (p. 162). As a result, Leuchtenburg commits the same error 
that Roosevelt did, accepting the premise that the 1937 Revolution could 
only have been accomplished through a direct assault on the Court. 
III. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE NEW DEAL 
The true nature of the Courtpacking fight becomes clear in a related 
battle, the effort to reorganize the Justice Department, which combines 
the themes of bad lawyering and Roosevelt's desire to increase the power 
of the presidency. In 1933, FDR reorganized the Justice Department to 
give it exclusive authority over much government litigation.'06 While this 
change served centralized planning objectives, Roosevelt failed to recog- 
nize its effect on the quality of government lawyering. In this way, 
Roosevelt's failure to appreciate the role of government litigators and 
statute writers during the Courtpacking episode is part of a larger pattern 
in which his pursuit of centralized planning blinded him to other ways of 
solving the problem of the Old Court. Correspondingly, just as New Deal 
opponents capitalized on voters' concerns of a too powerful President in 
order to bring down the Court plan, Roosevelt's efforts to reform the 
administrative state were also undermined by these fears, fears which first 
took hold during the Courtpacking crisis. Ironically, Roosevelt pursued 
both Courtpacking and the Justice Department reorganization as means 
to the larger. end of strengthening the administrative presidency. As this 
Part will show, the defeat of Roosevelt's administrative presidency cam- 
paign can be traced to these two initiatives. 
A. The Department ofJustice in the Age of Roosevelt 
The New Deal was a "'lawyer's deal,'" a period where "lawyers and 
legal means would stop the country's deterioration," where lawyers " 'en- 
joyed direct access to . . . [the] critical levers of power and monopolized 
the instruments of governance,'" and where, for the editors of Ivy 
League law reviews, "the lucre of New York did not match the excitement 
106. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901 
(1988). 
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posed by the problems confronting Washington."'107 With the rise of the 
administrative state, the lawyer's craft-the drafting of statutes and imple- 
menting regulations, as well as litigation defending their workproduct- 
dominated New Deal policymaking.108 As a result, the New Deal trig- 
gered not only an explosion in the ranks of government lawyers109 but 
also numerous political battles over the proper conduct of federal legal 
policymaking. 
Roosevelt, although a lawyer himself, placed little faith in the power 
of good lawyering to overcome Old Court opposition to New Deal re- 
forms. His Courtpacking plan, by seeking to remake the Court through 
political means, reflects this belief. This compartmentalized view that the 
possible influence of legal arguments should give way to concerns of 
power and politics also characterized Roosevelt's management of the fed- 
eral legal apparatus. In 1933, Roosevelt strengthened the Department of 
Justice's control of litigation so that he could better supervise the opera- 
tions of government agencies.110 Consistent with his determination that 
politics, not lawyering, mattered, Roosevelt did not consider the conse- 
quences of this reorganization on New Deal lawyering before the federal 
courts. As a result, Roosevelt paid little, if any attention to disputes be- 
tween the Department of Justice and New Deal agencies over the proper 
handling of litigation. In retrospect, these disputes should have signalled 
to the President the possibility that lawyering, after all, may matter. 
Reorganization of the Justice Department was not a novel concept in 
1933. Beginning with the establishment of aJustice Department in 1870, 
Attorneys General have consistently sought to strengthen their control of 
government litigation.111 Standing in the way, however, were powerful 
department solicitors and their allies in Congress who limited Depart- 
ment of Justice authority through grants of independent litigation au- 
thority.112 In fact, on the eve of the New Deal, Attorney General John 
Sargent reported to Congress that only 115 of 900 federally employed 
attorneys were under his control, and at least nine separate government 
107. Glennon, supra note 80, at 69 (quoting Irons, supra note 16, at x). 
108. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 68-70. 
109. It is interesting to note that the staff of theJustice Department grew from 250 in 
1905 to 32,000 in 1968. See id. at 214 n.8. 
110. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901 
(1988), discussed infra note 116. 
111. See Cornell N. Clayton, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the 
Making of Legal Policy 73 (1992); Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 
25 Va. L. Rev. 165, 181-201 (1938); Carl B. Swisher, Federal Organization of Legal 
Functions, 33 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 973, 975-95 (1939). 
112. Congress limited Roosevelt's control of the administrative state by continuing to 
grant litigation authority to select agencies throughout Roosevelt's presidency. See 
Swisher, supra note 111, at 991-95. For treatments of the consequences of these grants of 
litigation authority, see generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor 
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 255, 321-27 (1994); 
Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal Litigating 
Authority, 68Judicature 70, 73 (1984). 
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agencies or departments had independent litigation authority.113 
Through powers granted to the President under the 1932 Economy 
Act,114 however, Roosevelt, at the urging of Attorney General Homer 
Cummings,115 issued a June 1933 executive order that confined to "the 
Department of Justice the responsibility of prosecuting and defending 
Court actions to which the United States is a party."116 
Centralization of litigation authority did not sit well with the talented 
New Deal lawyers who dominated the federal agencies and depart- 
ments.117 Having come to Washington to work for newly created agen- 
cies, and determined to find creative solutions to the economic crisis that 
ravaged the country, these lawyers wanted to change the world, not to 
play second fiddle to the Department of Justice." 8 Consequently, when 
the Department of Justice sought to rein in highly talented agency law- 
yers and assert its dominance over federal legal policymaking, all hell 
broke loose. Unwilling to cede voluntarily authority to the Department 
of Justice, New Deal lawyers complained bitterly about the Department's 
mishandling of its legal work.'19 For its part, the Department sometimes 
appeared at least as interested in building up its power as it did in win- 
ning lawsuits.'20 
113. See Clayton, supra note 111, at 75. 
114. Pub. L. No. 212, 47 Stat. 382, 413 (1932) as amended by Pub. L. No. 428, 47 Stat. 
1489, 1517-18 (1933). Under the statute, Congress could disapprove of proposed 
reorganizations through a legislative veto. For a discussion of the politics of this legislative 
veto provision, see Fisher & Devins, supra note 64, at 121-42. 
115. See Irons, supra note 16, at 146. 
116. Exec. Order No. 6166, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901 (1988). Under 
the executive order, the internal legal work of government agencies was to be handled by 
the agency itself. For further discussion of this divorce of functions, see Donald L. 
Horowitz, The Jurocracy 12-24 (1977); Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: 
Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in Government Lawyers 143 (Cornell 
W. Clayton ed., 1995); Swisher, supra note 111, at 999-1000. 
117. The Agricultural Agency Administration's Office of General Counsel, for 
example, was headed by former Yale law professor and future appeals court judge Jerome 
Frank and was staffed by future Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, future democratic 
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, future Yale law dean Wesley Sturges, future appeals 
courtjudge Thurman Arnold, future Nuremberg war-crimes prosecutor and Columbia law 
professor Telford Taylor, and Holmes law clerk and future subject of anti-communist 
investigations Alger Hiss. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 70-72. 
118. Making matters worse, these lawyers doubted the abilities of Department of 
Justice lawyers, most of whom had come to the Department at a time when institutional 
and other limitations impeded its efforts to hire quality lawyers. Specifically, the 
Department was limited both by numerous statutory exceptions to its presumptive control 
of government litigation and by the fact that government jobs were not considered as 
attractive as jobs with New York law firms. See id. at 68-70 (discussing the dominance of 
New York law firms prior to the creation of New Deal agencies); Swisher, supra note 111, at 
999-1000 (discussing how Roosevelt's reorganization affected the Department of Justice's 
legal policymaking authority). 
119. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 83-84; see also Irons, supra note 16, at 220-25. 
120. See, e.g., Irons, supra note 16, at 220-25 (discussing "the emerging political duel 
between the two agencies"-the National Labor Relations Board and the Justice 
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The resulting conflicts, needless to say, did not help New Deal re- 
form efforts. Turf wars between the Justice Department and New Deal 
agencies over the conduct and control of litigation proved time-consum- 
ing and emotionally draining.'21 More significantly, after wrestling con- 
trol of litigation from a resisting agency, the Department sometimes 
proved ill-equipped to advance vigorously agency interests.'22 Finally, at 
times, efforts at coordination between Department and agency attorneys 
backfired.'23 As a result, while an internal Department memorandum 
emphasized that "care must be taken to avoid the impression that we are 
seeking to curb or limit the authority of a particular agency,"'124 the De- 
partment concluded that the best way to avoid "mishaps" was to be unre- 
lenting in its quest to establish itself as chief litigator for the United 
Department-and that duel's negative impact on creating an effective litigation strategy); 
see also supra note 82. 
121. Peter Irons describes three competing litigation strategies in his study on New 
Deal lawyering: the use of political pressure to settle disagreements (legal politics), the use 
of negotiation instead of litigation (legal reform), and the use of litigation to gain formal 
court approval of agency action (legal crafting). Not surprisingly, as Irons recounts in 
detail, the choice of one or another of these competing models prompted different types 
of conflicts between New Deal agencies and the Department ofJustice. All of these battles, 
however, were time consuming and emotional. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3-14; see also 
Glennon, supra note 80, at 83-84 (describing conflict between Justice Department and 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration). My research assistant, Roderick Ingram, 
reached a similar conclusion after reviewing Attorney General Cummings's papers at the 
University of Virginia. Cummings and his staff, for example, fought bitter fights with the 
General Accounting Office, the Department of Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
and the National Recovery Administration. See The Papers of Homer Stille Cummings 
(Special Collection of Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Accession # 9973) 
[hereinafter Cummings Papers]. 
122. See supra notes 80-87, and infra note 123 and accompanying text; see also 
Glennon, supra note 80, at 84 (describing how Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
litigation was turned over to "neophyte Justice Department] attorneys" who were no 
match against industry's "skilled trial lawyers"); see Irons, supra note 16, at 86-94 
(describing Department ofJustice's mishandling of National Recovery Act litigation); id. at 
155 (noting that AAA lawyers "blame[d] their defeats . on the inexperience of Justice 
Department lawyers). 
123. At oral arguments in the National Recovery Act litigation, attorneys for the 
National Recovery Administration and Department ofJustice "openly disagreed before the 
Court on the meaning of the statute and its implications for the determinative delegation 
issue." Rauh, supra note 16, at 950; see also Irons, supra note 16, at 95-100 (describing 
oral arguments for Schechter case). Another example of failed cooperation involved 
Attorney General Cummings's authorization of the Petroleum Board to litigate a case on 
its own behalf. This decision prompted several government agencies to complain to 
Cummings about both the litigation strategy and the legal position advanced by the Board. 
This episode is recounted in Letter from Homer S. Cummings, Attorney General, to 
Charles E. Clark, Dean, Yale Law School (May 12, 1934), in Cummings Papers, supra note 
121, Box 177, Folder 1934 March: Department of Justice Case File, 114-57-1-3. 
124. Memorandum from Ugo Carusi, Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, to 
Angus D. MacLean, Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 4, 1934), in Cummings Papers, supra 
note 121, Box 173, Folder 1934 October to 1938 August. 
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States.'25 During this period of transition,126 New Deal programmatic 
objectives sometimes gave way to New Deal efforts to strengthen the ad- 
ministrative presidency through the centralization of litigation authority. 
The Roosevelt White House did not intervene in these intra-execu- 
tive disputes.127 Believing that judicial appointments, not legal argu- 
ments, were the key to transforming the Court, Roosevelt apparently con- 
cluded these turf wars were inconsequential. Yet, even if the White 
House thought that legal advocacy mattered, FDR's interest in strength- 
ening the administrative presidency may well have justified the shift in 
litigation authority. In particular, by centralizing legal policymaking in 
the Justice Department, the government can speak with a single voice in 
court. Equally significant, the President or his cabinet level surrogate, 
the Attorney General, is in charge of that voice. Under a decentralized 
scheme, in contrast, government agencies-subject to competing exter- 
nal pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests-will 
sometimes square off with each other in court.128 Decentralization, 
moreover, encourages agencies to advance conflicting approaches to ju- 
risdiction, statutory interpretation, and other issues that cut across all gov- 
ernment litigation. To prevent New Deal agencies from discounting the 
consequences of their legal arguments for other parts of the government, 
it makes sense that Roosevelt would have wanted the Department of Jus- 
tice to coordinate government litigation. 129 
125. See Memorandum of unidentified author, Cummings Papers, supra note 121. 
Box 177, Folder 1933July to 1935: Department ofJustice Case File, 114-0, Sec. 1-8. This 
memorandum also notes that the granting of litigation authority to the Petroleum Board 
was "an unwise expedient because they did not have the sense of responsibility to the 
Department ofJustice. We had to terminate that arrangement in order to be sure that we 
could control properly the work for which were responsible." Id.; see also Power of the 
Attorney General in Matters of Compromise, 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 124 (1934) (Executive 
Order No. 6166 "vests in the Attorney General exclusive control of any case after reference 
thereof to the Department of Justice."). 
126. Today, of course, there are far fewer battles between the Department and its 
agency clients. See Horowitz, supra note 116, at 133. Moreover, by having established its 
control over nearly all governmental litigation, the Department is able to recruit the best 
students from the most selective law schools. See id. at 132; U.S. Dep't of Justice, United 
States Department of Justice Legal Activities 1995-96, at 8 (1995) (discussing how its 
recruitment program is "highly competitive," accepting only "outstanding" third year law 
students). 
127. Research undertaken by myself and my research assistants at the FDR 
Presidential Library and the Homer Stille Cummings papers did not uncover direct White 
House participation in intraexecutive litigation disputes. By failing to intercede when the 
Justice Department upset agency desired, however, the White House tacitly supported the 
Department's position. 
128. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (whose performance as 
enforcer of environmental laws is at least sometimes measured by its aggressiveness) and 
the Department of Energy (as potential violator of environmental laws) are likely to 
advance different arguments in court. 
129. The Roosevelt Department of Justice adopted this view-proclaiming, for 
example, that one of the Solicitor General's principal functions is "to protect against 
different agencies' taking inconsistent positions or positions which injure each other." 
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This approach towards centralized, coordinated legal policymaking 
matched Roosevelt's views on reorganization. According to Richard 
Polenberg, Roosevelt felt that the primary purpose of reorganization was 
not to reduce expenditures, but to strengthen the administrative presi- 
dency through "improved management, which would make administra- 
tion more responsive to the national interest and better able to serve that 
interest."'130 Along these lines, Roosevelt's Justice Department officials 
spoke of "[c]onsistency . . . in the field of litigation" being "absolutely 
necessary to the maintenance of efficiency and good administration," so 
that when the United States appears in court "it appears as a single en- 
tity."1131 This linkage between "efficiency" and the United States appear- 
ing in court "as a single entity" is critical. It underscores the Roosevelt 
Administration's belief in the President's role as chief executive of the 
administrative state. In contrast, were the United States a conglomera- 
tion of "autonomous units," Justice Department control of litigation 
might well frustrate the "autonomous" nature of government depart- 
ments and agencies. 
B. Courtpacking and the Failed Reorganization of Roosevelt's Government 
Roosevelt's efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency ex- 
tended well beyond his 1933 reorganization of the Department ofJustice. 
Through his Committee on Administrative Management, headed by 
Louis Brownlow, Roosevelt sought to expand the power of the President 
and of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.132 First, Roosevelt em- 
braced national planning, proclaiming that " 'the problems of townships, 
counties and States, should be coordinated through large geographical 
regions.' "133 Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted a National Planning Board 
housed in the White House to oversee this regional system of planning 
Memorandum from Richard S. Salant to the Solicitor General July 1, 1943) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
130. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 7. 
131. Key, supra note 111, at 198-99. Roosevelt, however, claimed that the 
'justification for sending this Justice Department] Executive Order up [to Congress]. . . is 
that it will effect a savings of more than $25,000,000." Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message to 
Congress Transmitting Executive Order No. 6166, Consolidating and Abolishing Many 
Governmental Agencies (June 10, 1933), in 2 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 223. In 
all likelihood, this cost-cutting argument was advanced to help Roosevelt sell this 
reorganization to Congress. This conclusion is supported by the Justice Department's 
emphasis on efficiency concerns in its active lobbying for this order as well as Roosevelt's 
rejection of cost savings justifications for governmental reorganizations. See Irons, supra 
note 16, at 146; Key, supra note 111, at 198-99; see also Polenberg, supra note 14, at 8 
(noting that Roosevelt perceived " 'that it is awfully erroneous to assume that it is in the 
reorganization of Departments and Bureaus that you save money' " (quoting Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Press Conference (May 31, 1933), in 1 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 
333-34)). 
132. See generally Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency 81-117 (1986) 
(examining Roosevelt's contribution to nearly a century of administrative reorganization). 
133. Karl, supra note 57, at 186. 
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boards.'34 Second, Roosevelt sought to strike back at Congressional ef- 
forts to limit presidential control of independent regulatory agencies.'35 
Indeed, consistent with Roosevelt's view that " 'the independent commis- 
sions [should be] brought under the general supervision of Cabinet of- 
ficers,' "136 the Brownlow Committee deemed independent agencies to 
be Public Enemy Number One. In the Committee's view, independent 
agencies undermined the President's power to direct governmental oper- 
ations by removing those subordinates who were unable to advance his 
agenda in a satisfactory manner.137 Starting in January 1937, the Admin- 
istration tried to consolidate presidential authority through a massive re- 
organization of the burgeoning administrative state, including the estab- 
lishment of a National Resources Planning Board.'38 Yet just as the 
Supreme Court thwarted its efforts to gain control of these commissions 
in Humphrey's Executor,'39 the 1938 Congress rejected these administrative 
reforms.140 
Congress had good reason to oppose the Roosevelt reorganization, 
especially its national planning component. As Barry Karl observed, 
" [p] lanning requires administration. Administration requires bureau- 
cracy. Bureaucracy threatens legislative control."''4' In fact, to combat 
executive branch dominion of government, Congress purposefully lim- 
ited presidential control of the bureaucracy by creating independent reg- 
ulatory commissions.142 Consequently, had it approved Roosevelt's pro- 
posed reorganization, Congress would have severely limited its own 
institutional authority.'43 Congress, however, did approve FDR's 1933 re- 
134. See id. at 188 (discussing Roosevelt's attempts at managing the New Deal 
through reorganization and the Brownlow Committee). 
135. See infra note 142; cf. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 444 (The "legacy of Progressive 
faith in technocracy . . . [which] translated into a large degree of autonomy for agency 
officials" had as much to do with these Congressional restrictions on presidential authority 
as did congressional distrust of a very powerful president.). 
136. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 25. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46; see also Arnold, supra note 132, at 
105-06 (noting that the Brownlow Report recommended transferring the policy- 
administrative operations of independent agencies to executive departments and 
agencies). 
138. See Karl, supra note 57, at 182-87. 
139. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
140. For a comprehensive examination of these failed reorganization efforts, see 
Polenberg, supra note 14, at 28-51. 
141. Karl, supra note 57, at 192. 
142. See id. at 192-93; see also Polenberg, supra note 14, at 44-45 (describing how 
Congressional pressure prompted Roosevelt to back down from attempts to reorganize the 
independent regulatory commissions). In addition, throughout Roosevelt's presidency, 
Congress limited Department ofJustice control of independent agency litigation through 
grants of independent litigation authority. See Swisher, supra note 111, at 991-95. 
143. For an analogous argument, explaining why Congress conditions its grants of 
legislative authority through the legislative veto and other checking mechanisms, see Louis 
Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273 
(Autumn 1993). 
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organization of the Justice Department.144 Wfhat explains this difference 
between the 1933 Congress and the 1938 Congress-which, incidentally, 
had an even more lopsided Democratic majority than the 1933 Congress? 
Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan played a decisive role here. 
"[R] eorganization was largely forgotten" during the Court controversy.145 
Moreover, with "[t]he conservative opposition to Roosevelt crystallized 
around the Court issue,"'46 Roosevelt's critics succeeded in depicting the 
reorganization proposal as yet another attempt by Roosevelt to "establish 
an executive dictatorship."'147 Specifically, just as the Courtpacking plan 
exposed Roosevelt to charges that he placed his political agenda ahead of 
the rule of law, the reorganization plan likewise was resisted because of 
"fears and anxieties produced by European dictatorship."'148 Roosevelt 
could not overcome this specter of a centralized totalitarian regime un- 
dermining democratic rule, for Courtpacking plan opponents had suc- 
ceeded in casting him as a man of power rather than a man of law.'49 
Consequently, unlike the One Hundred Days War, when Roosevelt was 
able to push through his reorganization of theJustice Department,150 the 
Courtpacking plan backlash made impossible any further expansions of 
the administrative presidency. 
Roosevelt was crushed by this defeat, having made attaining the aims 
of the Brownlow Committee the centerpiece of his 1936-1940 term.15' 
What is truly amazing and ironic about this turn of events is the pivotal 
role played by Courtpacking in the undoing of this "Third New Deal."'152 
First, the 1933 Congress that overwhelmingly approved Roosevelt's De- 
partment of Justice reorganization may well have been willing to approve 
his 1937 reorganization plan. Second, absent the Courtpacking debacle, 
it seems likely that the 1938 Congress would have approved the Roosevelt 
reorganization. Even with the baggage of Courtpacking and ever-increas- 
ing fears of Europe's totalitarian regimes, the 1937 reorganization none- 
theless passed the Senate and nearly passed the House (where it was re- 
144. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
145. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 28; see also Arnold, supra note 132, at 109 (noting 
that Roosevelt "ask [ed] his son James to shepherd the reorganization program while he 
gave primary attention to the judiciary plan"). 
146. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 88. 
147. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 194. 
148. Id. at 149. 
149. See id. at 148-52. 
150. Roosevelt sent Executive Order No. 6166 to Congress on June 10, 1933, the last 
scheduled day of the 100 Day session. While some members characterized Roosevelt's 
action as a "contemptuous gesture toward the Members of Congress," 77 Cong. Rec. 5617 
(1933) (statement of Sen. Reed), and complained that "[t]here is no way in which 
Congress can pass upon this matter under these circumstances," id. at 5600 (statement of 
Sen. Borah), most members applauded the consolidation of government litigation in the 
Justice Department, condemning the existing arrangement as "a maze of conflicting and 
anomalous provisions." Id. at 5615 (statement of Sen. Robinson). 
151. See Karl, supra note 57, at 187-88. 
152. See id. at 188. 
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jected by a vote of 204 to 196, with 108 Democrats voting against the 
bill).153 Needing only four additional votes to win approval, Roosevelt 
might have had the political leverage to persevere in Congress without 
the Courtpacking's galvanizing effect on the opposition. Third, had FDR 
not pursued Courtpacking, not only would Congress have approved his 
reorganization but, as Part II suggests, the Supreme Court may well have 
upheld this Third New Deal. For example, nothing in Humphrey's Executor 
or any other Supreme Court separation of powers decision limits Con- 
gress from making independent agencies more like executive depart- 
ments and agencies.'54 In other words, by leaving the Court issue alone, 
Roosevelt-rather than suffer the Courtpacking's devastating boome- 
rang-could have garnered congressional and judicial approval of his 
Third New Deal. Fourth (and relatedly), by pursuing Courtpacking, 
Roosevelt undermined the very objectives he was trying to pursue, 
namely, to strengthen centralized governmental controls and to place the 
President in charge of the administrative state.'55 
The Courtpacking plan and the Justice Department reorganization 
both show a similar failure to value properly the ability of lawyers to make 
a difference. As a result, the Department of Justice reorganization may 
have started a chain of events leading through the Courtpacking episode 
and onto the failure of subsequent broader reforms. Had the Adminis- 
tration perceived the nexus between good lawyering and success in court, 
it might have delayed its Courtpacking plan and paid more attention to 
the consequences of its Justice Department reorganization. In particular, 
as Part II suggests, there was reason for the Roosevelt Administration to 
be cautiously optimistic about the Court's 1936-37 term. The Courtpack- 
ing plan, however, presupposed that the Old Court would not deem con- 
sequential either the 1936 election or differences between First and Sec- 
ond New Deal legislation and lawyering. Furthermore, as this Part 
reveals, there was also reason for the Roosevelt Administration to recog- 
nize that the Justice Department reorganization affected government 
lawyering before the Supreme Court. In advancing its Courtpacking 
plan, however, the administration never considered the possible conse- 
quences of its reorganization effort. In other words, although strength- 
153. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 279. 
154. Roosevelt therefore could have overcome Humphrey's Executor through political 
means. Since Humphrey's Executor was a unanimous decision, Roosevelt-even with several 
Supreme Court appointments-could not realistically expect the Court to overturn it. 
155. For similar reasons, Roosevelt was also outraged by the Supreme Court's 
invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). By holding that Congress had gone too far in delegating 
lawmaking power to the president, Schechter stood in the way of FDR's efforts to centralize 
authority through broadly worded Congressional delegations. See Karl, supra note 57, at 
197 ("Schechter was a criticism ... [of] a far-reaching design for governmental reform."). 
See generally, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the 
United States 273-74 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the "Roosevelt Revolution" and the 
changing functions of government). 
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ening the Justice Department furthered Roosevelt's vision of the adminis- 
trative presidency, Roosevelt erred by failing to link this reform effort to 
Supreme Court decisionmaking. This is not to say that the Justice De- 
partment reorganization is to blame for the Supreme Court's rejection of 
much of Roosevelt's First New Deal.'56 Yet, by assuming that litigation 
skills have no bearing on outcomes, Roosevelt's simultaneous pursuit of 
Supreme Court and Justice Department reorganization cost him dearly. 
Future social reform and reorganization efforts were casualties to a 
Courtpacking plan that marked "the beginning of the end of the New 
Deal."'57 
CONCLUSION 
The Courtpacking episode, despite the passage of sixty years and 
countless hours of academic attention, remains a subject of debate. Over 
the past two years, for example, important questions have been raised 
about both Justice Roberts's claim that the Courtpacking plan did not 
affect his "switch"'58 and the generally accepted view that the Constitu- 
tional Revolution of 1937 transformed, rather than built upon, existing 
Court doctrine.'59 Courtpacking's continuing relevancy is not limited to 
academic writings. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'60 the Supreme Court's 
surprising 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights, the plurality and dissent- 
ing opinions advanced strikingly different visions of Courtpacking's role 
in the 1937 Revolution. For the plurality, who sought to distinguish the 
1937 "switch" from efforts to have the Court overrule Roe v. Wade under 
"political fire," there is no reference to the Courtpacking conflagration. 
Instead, the switch is described as a response to the Old Court's "funda- 
mentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unreg- 
ulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."'6' For the dis- 
sent, the plurality committed error by failing to consider "Franklin 
Roosevelt's proposal to 'reorganize' this Court," for it "is difficult to imag- 
ine a situation in which the Court would face more intense [pressure] 
than it did at that time."'62 
William Leuchtenburg's The Supreme Court Reborn, while it will not 
end the debate over the Courtpacking plan, is an enormously valuable 
contribution to an overcrowded field. By telling the story of the politics 
156. Cf. Rauh, supra note 16, at 948-50 (stating that poor litigation was unrelated to 
the Supreme Court's rejection of the New Deal); Treanor, supra note 16, at 612 (stating 
that composition of Supreme Court was behind the failure of the New Deal). 
157. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 88. 
158. See AMiens, supra note 93, at 623. 
159. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 203. 
160. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
161. Id. at 2812. 
162. Id. at 2863 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The 1995 Lopez decision also hints at 
the Courtpacking's continuing relevance, with Justice Souter noting in dissent that the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 occurred "only after one of this Court's most chastening 
experiences." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1652 (1995) (SouterJ., dissenting). 
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behind the Courtpacking plan, The Supreme Court Reborn makes clear that 
neither Roosevelt nor his staff, including Attorney General Homer Cum- 
mings, thought that the Old Court could be moved by better legal advo- 
cacy, statutory drafting, or Roosevelt's 1936 electoral landslide. More- 
over, through his review of the Humphrey's Executor litigation, 
Leuchtenburg also reveals that the Courtpacking plan was as much about 
Roosevelt's interest in strengthening the administrative presidency as it 
was about New Deal social reform programs. 
Leuchtenburg does not address the role that poor lawyering and stat- 
utory drafting may have played in the Court's repudiation of the National 
Recovery Act, Agricultural Adjustment Act, and several other One Hun- 
dred Day reforms. While suggesting that better lawyering could not over- 
come Supreme Court resistance towards Roosevelt and his New Deal, 
Leuchtenburg's failure to consider meaningfully this issue leaves his his- 
tory subject to attack. For example, there is good reason to think that the 
confluence of the 1936 election and improvements in the crafting of leg- 
islation to meet judicially imposed hurdles played a decisive role in the 
"switch" that began the 1937 Revolution. 
Leuchtenburg also does not consider the possible significance of 
Roosevelt's 1933 Department of Justice reorganization to Courtpacking. 
This reorganization is illuminating for two quite disparate reasons. First, 
although this reorganization affected government litigation before the 
Supreme Court, Roosevelt never took this reorganization into account 
when formulating his Courtpacking proposal. Second, Congress's will- 
ingness to accede to this reorganization suggests that Roosevelt's pursuit 
of Courtpacking undermined his administrative presidency agenda. 
Leuchtenburg should not be faulted too much for failing to consider 
these matters. He does not intend that his history speak to these issues. 
More than anything, his is the story of why the Roosevelt Administration 
pursued its Courtpacking plan, why the plan was defeated, and the conse- 
quences of its defeat. Consequently, just as the Roosevelt Administration 
did not seriously contemplate the possibility that its Constitutional 
Revolution could be launched without a "frontal attack" on the courts, 
Leuchtenburg, too, pays little attention to this issue. Correlatively, it is 
not surprising that Leuchtenburg does not address FDR's reorganization 
of the Justice Department, for the Roosevelt Administration never seri- 
ously considered the possible impact of this reorganization on its litiga- 
tion agenda. 
The Supreme Court Reborn, then, is neither monumental nor definitive. 
It is, however, essential reading on the Roosevelt Revolution. Literate 
and well-crafted, Leuchtenburg's work is a compelling account of the 
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1937 Constitutional Revolution through the eyes of the Roosevelt 
Administration. 163 
163. With a two-volume history of the constitutional crisis of the 1930s in the works, 
Leuchtenburg may yet speak the last word on those matters not considered in The Supreme 
Court Reborn (p. ix). 
